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science for himself, to resist invasions of it in the case of 
oi hers; OJ' their case may, by change of circumstances, become 
hi:-; own. It behooves him, too, -in his own case to give no 
of concession, betraying the common right of inde-
opi m'on, by answering questions of faith which the 
laws have left between God and himself." (Emphasis sup-
plied.) 
In the last analysis, when the moment of decision comes, 
to thr private citizen as well as to the judge, it is in the quiet 
of his o1vn mind and in the glow of his own courage that 
Americanism thrives. And it is in the cumulative decision of 
millions, eitizeu as well as official, that Amerieauism is reborn 
t•ach moment. 
l<'or the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment. 
Appellant's pl~tition for a rehearing was denied May 22, 
19:>7. Gibson, C. ,J., Cartr"r, ,T., and Traynor, J., were of the 
opinion that the petition should be granted. 
F. No. 19450. In Bank. Apr. 24, 1957.] 
DA~IEL PHlNCE, Appellant, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF 
SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent. 
[1] Taxation-Exemptions-Veterans.-Const., art. XX, § 19, lim-
the I'Pterans' tnx e.xemption to those otherwise entitled 
who do not advocate the overthrow of federal or state govern-
ment by force and violence or the support of a foreign 
gonrmuent in the event of hostilities against the United 
States, and Rev. & •rax. Code, § 32, requiring a declaration of 
loyn lty on claiming exemption from property tax, are valid; 
such codP section docs not fallaciously infer that those who 
do not subseribe to the oath engage in the prohibited activity. 
[2] Statutes-Title and Subject Matter-Constitutional Provision. 
---Coust., art. XX, § 19, relating to subversive persons and 
gl'oups, floes not violate Const., art. IV, § 24, declaring that 
en~r.v act shall Pmbrace but one subject which shall be ex-
pressed in its title, since article IV deals with the "Legislative 
Dep:1rtnwnt" and section 24 is intended to be and has been 
limited to legislative enactments under the Constitution. 
[1] See Cal.Jur., T:Jxation, § 93; Am.Jur., Taxation,§ 546 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Taxation,§ 79(2); [2] Statutes,§ 38. 
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APPEAI.~ from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. William T. Sweigert, 
Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to recover taxes paid under protest and for declara-
tory relief. Judgment for defendant affirmed. 
Lawrence Speiser and Ralph \Vertheimer for Appellant. 
Charles E. Beardsley and Stanley A. Weigel as Amici 
Curiae on behalf of Appellant. 
Dion R. Holm, City Attorney, Walker Peddicord, Chief 
Deputy City Attorney, and Robert M. Desky, Deputy City 
Attorney, for Respondent. 
SHENK, J.-This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a judg-
ment in favor oE the defendant in an action to recover taxes 
paid under protest and for declaratory relief. 
The plaintiff is a veteran of \Vorld \Var II and as such 
:filed applications for and obtained tax exemptions from the 
defendant city and county for the tax year,; 1951-1952, 1952-
1953 and 1953-1954, pursuant to the provisions of section 114 
of article XIII of the Constitution. 'l'hat section provides 
in its pertinent part,; as follo>YS: "The property to the 
amount of $1,000 of every resident of this State who has 
served in the Army, Navy, J\farine Corps, Coast Guard or 
Revenue Marine (Revenue Cutter) Service of the United 
States (1) in time of war, or (2) in time of peace, in a cam-
paign or expedition for senice in which a medal has been 
issued by the Congress of the United States, and in either 
case has received an honorable discharge therefrom, . . . shall 
be exempt from taxation. . . . '' 
On November 4, 1952, the Constitution was amended to add 
section 19 of article XX limiting the veterans' tax exemption, 
as well as other tax exemptions, to those otherwise entitled 
who do not advocate the overthrow of the federal or state 
government by force and violence or the support of a foreign 
government in the event of hostilities against the United 
States, and authorizing implementation by legislation to ef-
fectuate the provisions of the constitutional amendment. 
Accordingly, on July 1, 1953 (Stats. 1953, ch. 1503, § 1, p. 
3114) section 32 was added to the Revenue and Taxation 
Code providing that applications for tax exemptions must 
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contain an oath as specified by that section. The constitutional 
amendment and the implementing legislation are the same 
as those set forth and considered in the opinion of this court 
in First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. County of Los 
Angeles, ante, p. 419 [311 P.2d 508]. 
On April 12, 1954, the plaintiff filed in the office of the 
assessor of the defendant city and county an application for 
a property tax exemption for the tax year 1954-1955. The 
application form furnished by the assessor contained, for the 
first time, the nonsubversive affidavit required by section 32 
of the Hevenue and Taxation Code. The plaintiff failed and 
refused to sign the application containing the oath. Facts 
were stipulated to which otherwise appear to entitle the plain-
tiff to the exemption. The application was denied. 'fhe 
plaintiff paid the tax under protest and commenced this action 
to recover the same. He claims that he is entitled to the 
exemption without compliance with the constitutional amend-
ment and the statutory enactment passed in pursuance thereof. 
He contends that section 19 of article XX of the Constitution 
and section 32 of the Revenue and Taxation Code violate 
provisions of the state and federal Constitutions. In support 
of his contentions he argues that the provisions of our state 
law infringe upon various aspects of freedom of speech; that 
because section 32 of the Revenue and Taxation Code does 
not apply to all of those entitled to tax exemptions it con-
stitutes special legislation and he is denied due process and 
equal protection of the law, and that it fallaciously infers 
that those who do not sign the oath engage in the prohibited 
advocacy. It is also urged that the constitutional amendment 
is void because it embraces more than one subject. 
[1] In the case of First Unitarian Chttrch of Los Angeles v. 
County of Los Angeles, ante, p. 419 [311 P.2d 508], this 
court declared the purposes of the constitutional amendment 
and its implementing legislation as applied to churches and 
held both enactments to be valid. The same reasons and 
conclusions apply to tax exemption claims by veterans pro-
vided for in section 1% of article XIII of the Constitution. 
Veterans traditionally have been selected by the states and 
by the nation for numerous special bounties and benefits. 
These are said to be, in part at least, in consideration for 
services in the public interest and welfare and as encourage-
ment to others to follow their example. (See Allied Archi-
tects' Assn. v. Payne, 192 Cal. 431 [221 P. 209, 30 A.L.R. 
1029]; Veterans' Welfare Board v. Riley, 188 Cal. 607, 611 
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[206 P. 631] .) In the case of Fit"st Unitarian Chun;h of Los 
Angeles v. County of Los Angeles, above referred to, it was 
held that the pursuit of such objectives by the state through 
the means employed in the constitutional amendment and 
implementing legislation does not in any way violate the 
right of free speech; that the classifications imposed are rea-
sonable and proper; that they do not violate any constitutional 
provision, and that the oath requirement of section 32 of the 
Revenue and Taxation Code is valid. That case is controlling 
here. The further contention that section 32 fallaciously 
infers that those who do not subscribe to the oath engage 
in the prohibited activity is without merit. The Legis-
lature may properly require that a claimant perfect his 
application for a property tax exemption by compliance with 
reasonable regulations in implementation of section 1% of 
article XIII of the Constitution. (Chesney v. Byram, 15 
Cal.2d 460, 465 [101 P.2d 1106] .) [2] Finally, the plain-
tiff's contention that the constitutional amendment violates 
section 24 of article IV of the Constitution, which provides 
that ''Every act shall embrace but one subject, which subject 
shall be expressed in its title," is also without merit. .Article 
IV of the Constitution deals with the "Legislative Depart-
ment" and section 24 is intended to be and has been limited 
to legislative enactments under the Constitution. (See J1Ic-
Clure v. Riley, 198 Cal. 23, 26 [243 P. 429] ; Ex parte Haskell, 
112 Cal. 412, 421 [ 44 P. 725, 32 L.R..A. 527].) 
No good reason appears why veterans should not be re-
quired to comply with the same reasonable regulations and 
conditions provided by section 32 of the Revenue and Taxa-
tion Code as are applied to all other included tax exemption 
claimants. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
TR.AYNOR, J., Dissenting.-For the reasons stated in my 
dissenting opinion in First Unitat>ian Clmrch v. County of 
Los Angeles, ante, p. 419 [ 311 P.2d 508], I would reverse 
the judgment. 
Gibson, C. J., concurred. 
C.ARTER, J., Dissenting.-For the reasons stated in my dis-
senting opinion in ~Pirst Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. 
County of Los Angeles, ante, p. 419 [311 P.2d 508], I would 
reverse the judgment. 
